Locksmith.psm1
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function ConvertFrom-IdentityReference { <# .SYNOPSIS Converts an identity reference to a security identifier (SID). .DESCRIPTION The ConvertFrom-IdentityReference function takes an identity reference as input and converts it to a security identifier (SID). It supports both SID strings and NTAccount objects. .PARAMETER Object Specifies the identity reference to be converted. This parameter is mandatory. .EXAMPLE $object = "S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1013" ConvertFrom-IdentityReference -Object $object # Returns "S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1013" .EXAMPLE $object = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("DOMAIN\User") ConvertFrom-IdentityReference -Object $object # Returns "S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1013" #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$Object ) $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($Object) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } return $SID } function Export-RevertScript { <# .SYNOPSIS Creates a script that reverts the changes performed by Locksmith. .DESCRIPTION This script is used to revert changes performed by Locksmith. It takes in various arrays of objects representing auditing issues and ESC misconfirugrations. It creates a new script called 'Invoke-RevertLocksmith.ps1' and adds the necessary commands to revert the changes made by Locksmith. .PARAMETER AuditingIssues An array of auditing issues to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC1 An array of ESC1 changes to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC2 An array of ESC2 changes to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC3 An array of ESC3 changes to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC4 An array of ESC4 changes to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC5 An array of ESC5 changes to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC6 An array of ESC6 changes to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC11 An array of ESC11 changes to be reverted. .PARAMETER ESC13 An array of ESC13 changes to be reverted. .EXAMPLE $params = @{ AuditingIssues = $AuditingIssues ESC1 = $ESC1 ESC2 = $ESC2 ESC3 = $ESC3 ESC4 = $ESC4 ESC5 = $ESC5 ESC6 = $ESC6 ESC11 = $ESC11 ESC13 = $ESC13 } Export-RevertScript @params Reverts the changes performed by Locksmith using the specified arrays of objects. #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [array]$AuditingIssues, [array]$ESC1, [array]$ESC2, [array]$ESC3, [array]$ESC4, [array]$ESC5, [array]$ESC6, [array]$ESC11, [array]$ESC13 ) begin { $Output = 'Invoke-RevertLocksmith.ps1' $RevertScript = [System.Text.StringBuilder]::New() [void]$RevertScript.Append("<#`nScript to revert changes performed by Locksmith`nCreated $(Get-Date)`n#>`n") $Objects = $AuditingIssues + $ESC1 + $ESC2 + $ESC3 + $ESC4 + $ESC5 + $ESC6 + $ESC11 + $ESC13 } process { if ($Objects) { $Objects | ForEach-Object { [void]$RevertScript.Append("$($_.Revert)`n") } $RevertScript.ToString() | Out-File -FilePath $Output } } } function Find-AuditingIssue { <# .SYNOPSIS A function to find auditing issues on AD CS CAs. .DESCRIPTION This script takes an array of AD CS objects and filters them based on specific criteria to identify auditing issues. It checks if the object's objectClass is 'pKIEnrollmentService' and if the AuditFilter is not equal to '127'. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with information about the issue, fix, and revert actions. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies an array of ADCS objects to be checked for auditing issues. .OUTPUTS System.Management.Automation.PSCustomObject A custom object is created for each ADCS object that matches the criteria, containing the following properties: - Forest: The forest name of the object. - Name: The name of the object. - DistinguishedName: The distinguished name of the object. - Technique: The technique used to detect the issue (always 'DETECT'). - Issue: The description of the auditing issue. - Fix: The command to fix the auditing issue. - Revert: The command to revert the auditing issue. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADObject -Filter * -SearchBase 'CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=com' $AuditingIssues = Find-AuditingIssue -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects $AuditingIssues This example retrieves ADCS objects from the specified search base and passes them to the Find-AuditingIssue function. It then returns the auditing issues for later use. #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$ADCSObjects ) $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKIEnrollmentService') -and ($_.AuditFilter -ne '127') } | ForEach-Object { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName Technique = 'DETECT' Issue = "Auditing is not fully enabled on $($_.CAFullName). Important security events may go unnoticed." Fix = @" certutil.exe -config `'$($_.CAFullname)`' -setreg `'CA\AuditFilter`' 127 Invoke-Command -ComputerName `'$($_.dNSHostName)`' -ScriptBlock { Get-Service -Name `'certsvc`' | Restart-Service -Force } "@ Revert = @" certutil.exe -config $($_.CAFullname) -setreg CA\AuditFilter $($_.AuditFilter) Invoke-Command -ComputerName `'$($_.dNSHostName)`' -ScriptBlock { Get-Service -Name `'certsvc`' | Restart-Service -Force } "@ } if ($_.AuditFilter -match 'CA Unavailable') { $Issue.Issue = $_.AuditFilter $Issue.Fix = 'N/A' $Issue.Revert = 'N/A' } $Issue } } function Find-ESC1 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that have the ESC1 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on the specified conditions. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, Issue, Fix, Revert, and Technique. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeUsers Specifies the list of SIDs of safe users who are allowed to have specific rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER ClientAuthEKUs A list of EKUs that can be used for client authentication. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' $ClientAuthEKUs = '1\.3\.6\.1\.5\.5\.7\.3\.2|1\.3\.6\.1\.5\.2\.3\.4|1\.3\.6\.1\.4\.1\.311\.20\.2\.2|2\.5\.29\.37\.0' $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC1 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -ClientAuthEKUs $ClientAuthEKUs $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$ADCSObjects, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$SafeUsers, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ClientAuthEKUs ) $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($_.pkiExtendedKeyUsage -match $ClientAuthEKUs) -and ($_.'msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag' -band 1) -and !($_.'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' -band 2) -and ( ($_.'msPKI-RA-Signature' -eq 0) -or ($null -eq $_.'msPKI-RA-Signature') ) } | ForEach-Object { # Write-Host $_; continue foreach ($entry in $_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($entry.IdentityReference) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } if ( ($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers) -and ( ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'ExtendedRight') -or ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll') ) ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName IdentityReference = $entry.IdentityReference ActiveDirectoryRights = $entry.ActiveDirectoryRights Issue = @" $($entry.IdentityReference) can provide a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) while enrolling in this Client Authentication template, and enrollment does not require Manager Approval. The resultant certificate can be used by an attacker to authenticate as any principal listed in the SAN up to and including Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, or Domain Controllers. "@ Fix = @" # Enable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 2} "@ Revert = @" # Disable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 0} "@ Technique = 'ESC1' } $Issue } } } } function Find-ESC11 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that have the ESC11 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on objects that have the objectClass 'pKIEnrollmentService' and the InterfaceFlag set to 'No'. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, Technique, Issue, Fix, and Revert. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObject -Target (Get-Target) Find-ESC11 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ADCSObjects ) process { $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKIEnrollmentService') -and ($_.InterfaceFlag -ne 'Yes') } | ForEach-Object { [string]$CAFullName = "$($_.dNSHostName)\$($_.Name)" $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName Technique = 'ESC11' Issue = $_.InterfaceFlag Fix = 'N/A' Revert = 'N/A' } if ($_.InterfaceFlag -eq 'No') { $Issue.Issue = @" The IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST flag is disabled on this Certification Authority (CA). It is possible to relay NTLM authentication to the RPC interface of this CA. If the LAN Manager authentication level of any domain in this forest is 2 or less, an attacker can coerce authentication from a Domain Controller (DC) to receive a certificate which can be used to authenticate as that DC. "@ $Issue.Fix = @" # Enable the flag certutil -config $CAFullname -setreg CA\InterfaceFlags +IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST # Restart the Ceritification Authority service Invoke-Command -ComputerName `'$($_.dNSHostName)`' -ScriptBlock { Get-Service -Name `'certsvc`' | Restart-Service -Force } "@ $Issue.Revert = @" # Disable the flag certutil -config $CAFullname -setreg CA\InterfaceFlags -IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST # Restart the Ceritification Authority service Invoke-Command -ComputerName `'$($_.dNSHostName)`' -ScriptBlock { Get-Service -Name `'certsvc`' | Restart-Service -Force } "@ } $Issue } } } function Find-ESC13 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that have the ESC13 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on the specified conditions. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, Issue, Fix, Revert, and Technique. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeUsers Specifies the list of SIDs of safe users who are allowed to have specific rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER ClientAuthEKUs A list of EKUs that can be used for client authentication. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' $ClientAuthEKUs = '1\.3\.6\.1\.5\.5\.7\.3\.2|1\.3\.6\.1\.5\.2\.3\.4|1\.3\.6\.1\.4\.1\.311\.20\.2\.2|2\.5\.29\.37\.0' $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC13 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -ClientAuthEKUs $ClientAuthEKUs $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.ADEntity[]]$ADCSObjects, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$SafeUsers, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ClientAuthEKUs ) $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($_.pkiExtendedKeyUsage -match $ClientAuthEKUs) -and ($_.'msPKI-Certificate-Policy') } | ForEach-Object { foreach ($policy in $_.'msPKI-Certificate-Policy') { if ($ADCSObjects.'msPKI-Cert-Template-OID' -contains $policy) { $OidToCheck = $ADCSObjects | Where-Object 'msPKI-Cert-Template-OID' -EQ $policy if ($OidToCheck.'msDS-OIDToGroupLink') { foreach ($entry in $_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($entry.IdentityReference) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } if ( ($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers) -and ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'ExtendedRight') ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName IdentityReference = $entry.IdentityReference ActiveDirectoryRights = $entry.ActiveDirectoryRights LinkedGroup = $OidToCheck.'msDS-OIDToGroupLink' Issue = @" $($entry.IdentityReference) can enroll in this Client Authentication template which is linked to the group $($OidToCheck.'msDS-OIDToGroupLink'). If $($entry.IdentityReference) uses this certificate for authentication, they will gain the rights of the linked group while the group membership appears empty. "@ Fix = @" # Enable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 2} "@ Revert = @" # Disable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 0} "@ Technique = 'ESC13' } $Issue } } } } } } } function Find-ESC2 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that have the ESC2 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on the specified conditions. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, Issue, Fix, Revert, and Technique. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeUsers Specifies the list of SIDs of safe users who are allowed to have specific rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC2 -SafeUsers $SafeUsers $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$ADCSObjects, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$SafeUsers ) $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.ObjectClass -eq 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ( (!$_.pkiExtendedKeyUsage) -or ($_.pkiExtendedKeyUsage -match '2.5.29.37.0') ) -and !($_.'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' -band 2) -and ( ($_.'msPKI-RA-Signature' -eq 0) -or ($null -eq $_.'msPKI-RA-Signature') ) } | ForEach-Object { foreach ($entry in $_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($entry.IdentityReference) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } if ( ($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers) -and ( ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'ExtendedRight') -or ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll') ) ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName IdentityReference = $entry.IdentityReference ActiveDirectoryRights = $entry.ActiveDirectoryRights Issue = @" $($entry.IdentityReference) can use this template to request a Subordinate Certification Authority (SubCA) certificate without Manager Approval. The resultant certificate can be used by an attacker to instantiate their own SubCA which is trusted by AD. By default, certificates created from this attacker-controlled SubCA cannot be used for authentication, but they can be used for other purposes such as TLS certs and code signing. However, if an attacker can modify the NtAuthCertificates object (see ESC5), they can convert their rogue CA into one trusted for authentication. "@ Fix = @" # Enable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 2} "@ Revert = @" # Disable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 0} "@ Technique = 'ESC2' } $Issue } } } } function Find-ESC3Condition1 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that match the first condition required for ESC3 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on the specified conditions. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, Issue, Fix, Revert, and Technique. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeUsers Specifies the list of SIDs of safe users who are allowed to have specific rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC3Condition1 -SafeUsers $SafeUsers $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$ADCSObjects, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$SafeUsers ) $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($_.pkiExtendedKeyUsage -match $EnrollmentAgentEKU) -and !($_.'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' -band 2) -and ( ($_.'msPKI-RA-Signature' -eq 0) -or ($null -eq $_.'msPKI-RA-Signature') ) } | ForEach-Object { foreach ($entry in $_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($entry.IdentityReference) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } if ( ($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers) -and ( ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'ExtendedRight') -or ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll') ) ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName IdentityReference = $entry.IdentityReference ActiveDirectoryRights = $entry.ActiveDirectoryRights Issue = @" $($entry.IdentityReference) can use this template to request an Enrollment Agent certificate without Manager Approval. The resulting certificate can be used to enroll in any template that requires an Enrollment Agent to submit the request. "@ Fix = @" # Enable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 2} "@ Revert = @" # Disable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 0} "@ Technique = 'ESC3' } $Issue } } } } function Find-ESC3Condition2 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that match the second condition required for ESC3 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on the specified conditions. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, Issue, Fix, Revert, and Technique. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeUsers Specifies the list of SIDs of safe users who are allowed to have specific rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC3Condition2 -SafeUsers $SafeUsers $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$ADCSObjects, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$SafeUsers ) $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($_.pkiExtendedKeyUsage -match $ClientAuthEKU) -and !($_.'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' -band 2) -and ($_.'msPKI-RA-Application-Policies' -match '1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1') -and ($_.'msPKI-RA-Signature' -eq 1) } | ForEach-Object { foreach ($entry in $_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($entry.IdentityReference) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } if ( ($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers) -and ( ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'ExtendedRight') -or ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll') ) ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName IdentityReference = $entry.IdentityReference ActiveDirectoryRights = $entry.ActiveDirectoryRights Issue = @" If the holder of an Enrollment Agent certificate requests a certificate using this template, they will receive a certificate which allows them to authenticate as $($entry.IdentityReference). "@ Fix = @" First, eliminate unused Enrollment Agent templates. Then, tightly scope any Enrollment Agent templates that remain and: # Enable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 2} "@ Revert = @" # Disable Manager Approval `$Object = `'$($_.DistinguishedName)`' Get-ADObject `$Object | Set-ADObject -Replace @{'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' = 0} "@ Technique = 'ESC3' } $Issue } } } } function Find-ESC4 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that have the ESC4 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on the specified conditions. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, Issue, Fix, Revert, and Technique. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER DangerousRights Specifies the list of dangerous rights that should not be assigned to users. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeOwners Specifies the list of SIDs of safe owners who are allowed to have owner rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeUsers Specifies the list of SIDs of safe users who are allowed to have specific rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeObjectTypes Specifices a list of ObjectTypes which are not a security concern. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObject # GenericAll, WriteDacl, and WriteOwner all permit full control of an AD object. # WriteProperty may or may not permit full control depending the specific property and AD object type. $DangerousRights = @('GenericAll', 'WriteProperty', 'WriteOwner', 'WriteDacl') # -512$ = Domain Admins group # -519$ = Enterprise Admins group # -544$ = Administrators group # -18$ = SYSTEM # -517$ = Cert Publishers # -500$ = Built-in Administrator $SafeOwners = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$' # -512$ = Domain Admins group # -519$ = Enterprise Admins group # -544$ = Administrators group # -18$ = SYSTEM # -517$ = Cert Publishers # -500$ = Built-in Administrator # -516$ = Domain Controllers # -9$ = Enterprise Domain Controllers # -526$ = Key Admins # -527$ = Enterprise Key Admins # S-1-5-10 = SELF $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' # The well-known GUIDs for Enroll and AutoEnroll rights on AD CS templates. $SafeObjectTypes = '0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55|a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2' $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC4 -DangerousRights $DangerousRights -SafeOwners $SafeOwners -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -SafeObjectTypes $SafeObjectTypes $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ADCSObjects, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $DangerousRights, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $SafeOwners, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $SafeUsers, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $SafeObjectTypes, [int]$Mode ) $ADCSObjects | ForEach-Object { if ($_.Name -ne '' -and $null -ne $_.Name) { $Principal = [System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]::New($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } } if ( ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($SID -notmatch $SafeOwners) ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName Issue = @" $($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) has Owner rights on this template and can modify it into a template that can create ESC1, ESC2, and ESC3 templates. "@ Fix = @" `$Owner = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier(`'$PreferredOwner`') `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' `$ACL.SetOwner(`$Owner) Set-ACL -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' -AclObject `$ACL "@ Revert = @" `$Owner = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier(`'$($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner)`') `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' `$ACL.SetOwner(`$Owner) Set-ACL -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' -AclObject `$ACL "@ Technique = 'ESC4' } $Issue } foreach ($entry in $_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($entry.IdentityReference) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } if ( ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers) -and ($entry.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow') -and ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match $DangerousRights) -and ($entry.ObjectType -notmatch $SafeObjectTypes) ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName IdentityReference = $entry.IdentityReference ActiveDirectoryRights = $entry.ActiveDirectoryRights Issue = "$($entry.IdentityReference) has been granted " + "$($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights) rights on this template.`n" + "$($entry.IdentityReference) can likely modify this template into an ESC1 template." Fix = @" `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' foreach ( `$ace in `$ACL.access ) { if ( (`$ace.IdentityReference.Value -like '$($Principal.Value)' ) -and ( `$ace.ActiveDirectoryRights -notmatch '^ExtendedRight$') ) { `$ACL.RemoveAccessRule(`$ace) | Out-Null } } Set-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' -AclObject `$ACL "@ Revert = '[TODO]' Technique = 'ESC4' } if ( $Mode -in @(1, 3, 4) ) { Update-ESC4Remediation -Issue $Issue } $Issue } } } } function Find-ESC5 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that have the ESC5 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on the specified conditions. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, Issue, Fix, Revert, and Technique. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER DangerousRights Specifies the list of dangerous rights that should not be assigned to users. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeOwners Specifies the list of SIDs of safe owners who are allowed to have owner rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeUsers Specifies the list of SIDs of safe users who are allowed to have specific rights on the objects. This parameter is mandatory. .PARAMETER SafeObjectTypes Specifices a list of ObjectTypes which are not a security concern. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObject # GenericAll, WriteDacl, and WriteOwner all permit full control of an AD object. # WriteProperty may or may not permit full control depending the specific property and AD object type. $DangerousRights = @('GenericAll', 'WriteProperty', 'WriteOwner', 'WriteDacl') # -512$ = Domain Admins group # -519$ = Enterprise Admins group # -544$ = Administrators group # -18$ = SYSTEM # -517$ = Cert Publishers # -500$ = Built-in Administrator $SafeOwners = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$' # -512$ = Domain Admins group # -519$ = Enterprise Admins group # -544$ = Administrators group # -18$ = SYSTEM # -517$ = Cert Publishers # -500$ = Built-in Administrator # -516$ = Domain Controllers # -9$ = Enterprise Domain Controllers # -526$ = Key Admins # -527$ = Enterprise Key Admins # S-1-5-10 = SELF $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' # The well-known GUIDs for Enroll and AutoEnroll rights on AD CS templates. $SafeObjectTypes = '0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55|a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2' $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC5 -DangerousRights $DangerousRights -SafeOwners $SafeOwners -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -SafeObjectTypes $SafeObjectTypes $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ADCSObjects, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $DangerousRights, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $SafeOwners, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $SafeUsers, [Parameter(Mandatory)] $SafeObjectTypes ) $ADCSObjects | ForEach-Object { if ($_.Name -ne '' -and $null -ne $_.Name) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } } if ( ($_.objectClass -ne 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($SID -notmatch $SafeOwners) ) { switch ($_.objectClass) { computer { $IssueDetail = @" This computer is hosting a Certification Authority (CA). $($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) has full control of this object. There is little reason for anyone other than AD Admins to have elevated rights to this CA host. "@ } 'msPKI-Cert-Template-OID' { $IssueDetail = @" This Object Identifier (OID) can be modified into an Application Policy and linked to an empty Universal Group. If $($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) also has control over a certificate template (see ESC4), an attacker could link this Application Policy to the template. Once linked, any certificates issued from that template would allow an attacker to act as a member of the linked group (see ESC13). "@ } pKIEnrollmentService { $IssueDetail = @" $($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) can use these elevated rights to publish currently unpublished templates. If $($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) also has control over an unpublished certificate template (see ESC4), they could modify the template into an ESC1 template then publish the certificate. This published certificate could be use for privilege escalation and persistence. "@ } } if ($_.objectClass -eq 'certificationAuthority' -and $_.Name -eq 'NTAuthCertificates') { $IssueDetail = @" The NTAuthCertificates object determines which Certification Authorities are trusted by Active Directory (AD) for client authentication of all forms. $($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) can use their granted rights on NTAuthCertificates to add their own rogue CAs. Once the rogue CA is trusted, any client authentication certificates generated by the it can be used by the attacker. "@ } $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName objectClass = $_.objectClass Issue = @" $($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner) has Owner rights on this object. They are able to modify this object in whatever way they wish. $IssueDetail "@ Fix = @" `$Owner = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier(`'$PreferredOwner`') `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' `$ACL.SetOwner(`$Owner) Set-ACL -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' -AclObject `$ACL "@ Revert = " `$Owner = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier(`'$($_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Owner)`') `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' `$ACL.SetOwner(`$Owner) Set-ACL -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' -AclObject `$ACL" Technique = 'ESC5' } $Issue } foreach ($entry in $_.nTSecurityDescriptor.Access) { $Principal = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($entry.IdentityReference) if ($Principal -match '^(S-1|O:)') { $SID = $Principal } else { $SID = ($Principal.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])).Value } switch ($_.objectClass) { computer { $IssueDetail = @" This computer is hosting a Certification Authority (CA). It is likely $($entry.IdentityReference) can take control of this object. There is little reason for anyone other than AD Admins to have elevated rights to this CA host. "@ } 'msPKI-Cert-Template-OID' { $IssueDetail = @" This Object Identifier (OID) can be modified into an Application Policy and linked to an empty Universal Group. If $($entry.IdentityReference) also has control over a certificate template (see ESC4), an attacker could link this Application Policy to the template. Once linked, any certificates issued from that template would allow an attacker to act as a member of the linked group (see ESC13). "@ } pKIEnrollmentService { $IssueDetail = @" $($entry.IdentityReference) can use these elevated rights to publish currently unpublished templates. If $($entry.IdentityReference) also has control over an unpublished certificate template (see ESC4), they could modify the template into an ESC1 template then publish the certificate. This published certificate could be use for privilege escalation and persistence. "@ } } if ($_.objectClass -eq 'certificationAuthority' -and $_.Name -eq 'NTAuthCertificates') { $IssueDetail = @" The NTAuthCertificates object determines which Certification Authorities are trusted by Active Directory (AD) for client authentication of all forms. $($entry.IdentityReference) can use their granted rights on NTAuthCertificates to add their own rogue CAs. Once the rogue CA is trusted, any client authentication certificates generated by the it can be used by the attacker. "@ } if ( ($_.objectClass -ne 'pKICertificateTemplate') -and ($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers) -and ($entry.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow') -and ($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights -match $DangerousRights) -and ($entry.ObjectType -notmatch $SafeObjectTypes) ) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName IdentityReference = $entry.IdentityReference ActiveDirectoryRights = $entry.ActiveDirectoryRights Issue = @" $($entry.IdentityReference) has $($entry.ActiveDirectoryRights) elevated rights on this $($_.objectClass) object. $IssueDetail "@ Fix = @" `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' foreach ( `$ace in `$ACL.access ) { if ( (`$ace.IdentityReference.Value -like '$($Principal.Value)' ) -and ( `$ace.ActiveDirectoryRights -notmatch '^ExtendedRight$') ) { `$ACL.RemoveAccessRule(`$ace) | Out-Null } } Set-Acl -Path `'AD:$($_.DistinguishedName)`' -AclObject `$ACL "@ Revert = '[TODO]' Technique = 'ESC5' } $Issue } } } } function Find-ESC6 { <# .SYNOPSIS This script finds AD CS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects that have the ESC6 vulnerability. .DESCRIPTION The script takes an array of ADCS objects as input and filters them based on objects that have the objectClass 'pKIEnrollmentService' and the SANFlag set to 'Yes'. For each matching object, it creates a custom object with properties representing various information about the object, such as Forest, Name, DistinguishedName, Technique, Issue, Fix, and Revert. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS The script outputs an array of custom objects representing the matching ADCS objects and their associated information. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC6 $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ADCSObjects ) process { $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { ($_.objectClass -eq 'pKIEnrollmentService') -and ($_.SANFlag -ne 'No') } | ForEach-Object { [string]$CAFullName = "$($_.dNSHostName)\$($_.Name)" $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName Technique = 'ESC6' Issue = $_.SANFlag Fix = 'N/A' Revert = 'N/A' } if ($_.SANFlag -eq 'Yes') { $Issue.Issue = @" The dangerous EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag is enabled on $CAFullname. All templates published on this CA will accept a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) during enrollment even if the template is not specifically configured to allow a SAN. As of May 2022, Microsoft has neutered this situation by requiring all SANs to be strongly mapped to certificates. However, if strong mapping has been explicitly disabled on Domain Controllers, this configuration remains vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. "@ $Issue.Fix = @" # Disable the flag certutil -config $CAFullname -setreg policy\EditFlags -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 # Restart the Ceritification Authority service Invoke-Command -ComputerName `'$($_.dNSHostName)`' -ScriptBlock { Get-Service -Name `'certsvc`' | Restart-Service -Force } "@ $Issue.Revert = @" # Enable the flag certutil -config $CAFullname -setreg policy\EditFlags +EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 # Restart the Ceritification Authority service Invoke-Command -ComputerName `'$($_.dNSHostName)`' -ScriptBlock { Get-Service -Name `'certsvc`' | Restart-Service -Force } "@ } $Issue } } } function Find-ESC8 { <# .SYNOPSIS Finds ADCS objects with enrollment endpoints and identifies the enrollment type. .DESCRIPTION This script takes an array of ADCS objects and filters them based on the presence of a CA enrollment endpoint. It then determines the enrollment type (HTTP or HTTPS) for each object and returns the results. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of ADCS objects to process. This parameter is mandatory. .OUTPUTS An object representing the ADCS object with the following properties: - Forest: The forest name of the object. - Name: The name of the object. - DistinguishedName: The distinguished name of the object. - CAEnrollmentEndpoint: The CA enrollment endpoint of the object. - Issue: The identified issue with the enrollment type. - Fix: The recommended fix for the issue. - Revert: The recommended revert action for the issue. - Technique: The technique used to identify the issue. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $Results = $ADCSObjects | Find-ESC8 $Results #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ADCSObjects ) process { $ADCSObjects | Where-Object { $_.CAEnrollmentEndpoint } | ForEach-Object { foreach ($endpoint in $_.CAEnrollmentEndpoint) { $Issue = [pscustomobject]@{ Forest = $_.CanonicalName.split('/')[0] Name = $_.Name DistinguishedName = $_.DistinguishedName CAEnrollmentEndpoint = $endpoint.URL AuthType = $endpoint.Auth Issue = @' An HTTP enrollment endpoint is available. It is possible to relay NTLM authentication to this HTTP endpoint. If the LAN Manager authentication level of any domain in this forest is 2 or less, an attacker can coerce authentication from a Domain Controller (DC) and relay it to this HTTP enrollment enpoint to receive a certificate which can be used to authenticate as that DC. '@ Fix = @' Disable HTTP access and enforce HTTPS. Enable EPA. Disable NTLM authentication (if possible.) '@ Revert = '[TODO]' Technique = 'ESC8' } if ($endpoint.URL -match '^https:') { $Issue.Issue = @' An HTTPS enrollment endpoint is available. It may be possible to relay NTLM authentication to this HTTPS endpoint. Enabling IIS Extended Protection for Authentication or disabling NTLM authentication completely, NTLM relay is not possible. If those protection are not in place, and the LAN Manager authentication level of any domain in this forest is 2 or less, an attacker can coerce authentication from a Domain Controller (DC) and relay it to this HTTPS enrollment enpoint to receive a certificate which can be used to authenticate as that DC. '@ $Issue.Fix = @' Ensure EPA is enabled. Disable NTLM authentication (if possible.) '@ } $Issue } } } } <# This is a working POC. I need to test both checks and possibly blend pieces of them. Then I need to fold this function into the Locksmith workflow. #> function Find-ESC9 { <# .SYNOPSIS Checks for ESC9 (No Security Extension) Vulnerability .DESCRIPTION This function checks for certificate templates that contain the flag CT_CLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION (0x80000), which will likely make them vulnerable to ESC9. Another factor to check for ESC9 is the registry values on AD domain controllers that can help harden certificate based authentication for Kerberos and SChannel. .NOTES An ESC9 condition exists when: - the new msPKI-Enrollment-Flag value on a certificate contains the flag CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION (0x80000) - AND an insecure regstry value is set on domain controllers: - the StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry value for Kerberos is not set to 2 (the default is 1) on domain controllers at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc - OR the CertificateMappingMethods registry value for SCHANNEL contains the UPN flag on domain controllers at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\Schannel When the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION (0x80000) flag is set on a certificate template, the new szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT security extension will not be embedded in issued certificates. This security extension was added by Microsoft's patch KB5014754 ("Certificate-based authentication changes on Windows domain controllers") on May 10, 2022. The patch applies to all servers that run Active Directory Certificate Services and Windows domain controllers that service certificate-based authentication. https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16 Based on research from https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16, and on a very long conversation with Bing Chat. Additional notes from Cortana -- Bing when I pressed her to tell me whether both conditions were required for ESC9 or only one of them: A certificate template can still be vulnerable to ESC9 even if the msPKI-Enrollment-Flag does not include CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION. This is because the vulnerability primarily arises from the ability of a requester to specify the subjectAltName in a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). If a requester can specify the subjectAltName in a CSR, they can request a certificate as anyone, including a domain admin user. Therefore, if a certificate template allows requesters to specify a subjectAltName and StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement is not set to 2, it could potentially be vulnerable to ESC9. However, the presence of CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION in msPKI-Enrollment-Flag is a clear indicator of a template being vulnerable to ESC9. #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] $ADCSObjects ) # Import the required module Import-Module ActiveDirectory # Get the configuration naming context $configNC = (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext # Define the path to the Certificate Templates container $path = "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,$configNC" # Get all certificate templates $templates = Get-ADObject -Filter * -SearchBase $path -Properties msPKI-Enrollment-Flag, msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag foreach ($template in $templates) { # Check if msPKI-Enrollment-Flag contains the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION (0x80000) flag if ($template.'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' -band 0x80000) { # Check if msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag contains the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME (0x2) flag if ($template.'msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag' -band 0x2) { # Output the template name Write-Output "Template Name: $($template.Name), Vulnerable to ESC9" } } } # AND / OR / ALSO Import-Module ActiveDirectory $templates = Get-ADObject -Filter { ObjectClass -eq "pKICertificateTemplate" } -Properties * foreach ($template in $templates) { $name = $template.Name $subjectNameFlag = $template.'msPKI-Cert-Template-OID' $subjectType = $template.'msPKI-Certificate-Application-Policy' $enrollmentFlag = $template.'msPKI-Enrollment-Flag' $certificateNameFlag = $template.'msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag' # Check if the template is vulnerable to ESC9 if ($subjectNameFlag -eq "Supply in the request" -and ($subjectType -eq "User" -or $subjectType -eq "Computer") -and # 0x200 means a certificate needs to include a template name certificate extension # 0x220 instructs the client to perform autoenrollment for the specified template ($enrollmentFlag -eq 0x200 -or $enrollmentFlag -eq 0x220) -and # 0x2 instructs the client to supply subject information in the certificate request (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT). # This means that any user who is allowed to enroll in a certificate with this setting can request a certificate as any # user in the network, including a privileged user. # 0x3 instructs the client to supply both the subject and subject alternate name information in the certificate request ($certificateNameFlag -eq 0x2 -or $certificateNameFlag -eq 0x3)) { # Print the template name and the vulnerability Write-Output "$name is vulnerable to ESC9" } else { # Print the template name and the status Write-Output "$name is not vulnerable to ESC9" } } } function Format-Result { <# .SYNOPSIS Formats the result of an issue for display. .DESCRIPTION This script formats the result of an issue for display based on the specified mode. .PARAMETER Issue The issue object containing information about the detected issue. .PARAMETER Mode The mode to determine the formatting style. Valid values are 0 and 1. .EXAMPLE Format-Result -Issue $Issue -Mode 0 Formats the issue result in table format. .EXAMPLE Format-Result -Issue $Issue -Mode 1 Formats the issue result in list format. .NOTES Author: Spencer Alessi #> [CmdletBinding()] param( $Issue, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [int]$Mode ) $IssueTable = @{ DETECT = 'Auditing Not Fully Enabled' ESC1 = 'ESC1 - Vulnerable Certificate Template - Authentication' ESC2 = 'ESC2 - Vulnerable Certificate Template - Subordinate CA' ESC3 = 'ESC3 - Vulnerable Certificate Template - Enrollment Agent' ESC4 = 'ESC4 - Vulnerable Access Control - Certificate Template' ESC5 = 'ESC5 - Vulnerable Access Control - PKI Object' ESC6 = 'ESC6 - EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 Flag Enabled' ESC8 = 'ESC8 - HTTP/S Enrollment Enabled' ESC11 = 'ESC11 - IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST Flag Disabled' ESC13 = 'ESC13 - Vulnerable Certificate Temple - Group-Linked' } if ($null -ne $Issue) { $UniqueIssue = $Issue.Technique | Sort-Object -Unique $Title = $($IssueTable[$UniqueIssue]) Write-Host "$('-'*($($Title.ToString().Length + 10)))" -ForegroundColor Black -BackgroundColor Magenta -NoNewline; Write-Host Write-Host " " -BackgroundColor Magenta -NoNewline Write-Host $Title -BackgroundColor Magenta -ForegroundColor Black -NoNewline Write-Host " " -BackgroundColor Magenta -NoNewline; Write-Host Write-Host "$('-'*($($Title.ToString().Length + 10)))" -ForegroundColor Black -BackgroundColor Magenta -NoNewline; Write-Host switch ($Mode) { 0 { $Issue | Format-Table Technique, Name, Issue -Wrap } 1 { if ($Issue.Technique -eq 'ESC5') { $Issue | Format-List Technique, Name, objectClass, DistinguishedName, Issue, Fix } elseif ($Issue.Technique -eq 'ESC8') { $Issue | Format-List Technique, Name, DistinguishedName, CAEnrollmentEndpoint, AuthType, Issue, Fix } else { $Issue | Format-List Technique, Name, DistinguishedName, Issue, Fix if (($Issue.Technique -eq "DETECT" -or $Issue.Technique -eq "ESC6") -and (Get-RestrictedAdminModeSetting)) { Write-Warning "Restricted Admin Mode appears to be configured. Certutil.exe may not work from this host, therefore you may need to execute the 'Fix' commands on the CA server itself" } } } } } } function Get-ADCSObject { <# .SYNOPSIS Retrieves Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) objects. .DESCRIPTION This script retrieves AD CS objects from the specified forests. It can be used to gather information about Public Key Services in Active Directory. .PARAMETER Targets Specifies the forest(s) from which to retrieve AD CS objects. .PARAMETER Credential Specifies the credentials to use for authentication when retrieving ADCS objects. .EXAMPLE Get-ADCSObject -Credential $cred This example retrieves ADCS objects from the local forest using the specified credentials. #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$Targets, [System.Management.Automation.PSCredential]$Credential ) foreach ( $forest in $Targets ) { if ($Credential) { $ADRoot = (Get-ADRootDSE -Credential $Credential -Server $forest).defaultNamingContext Get-ADObject -Filter * -SearchBase "CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,$ADRoot" -SearchScope 2 -Properties * -Credential $Credential } else { $ADRoot = (Get-ADRootDSE -Server $forest).defaultNamingContext Get-ADObject -Filter * -SearchBase "CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,$ADRoot" -SearchScope 2 -Properties * } } } function Get-CAHostObject { <# .SYNOPSIS Retrieves Certificate Authority (CA) host object(s) from Active Directory. .DESCRIPTION This script retrieves CA host object(s) associated with every CA configured in the target Active Directory forest. If a Credential is provided, the script retrieves the CA host object(s) using the specified credentials. If no Credential is provided, the script retrieves the CA host object(s) using the current credentials. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies an array of AD CS objects to retrieve the CA host object for. .PARAMETER Credential Specifies the credentials to use for retrieving the CA host object(s). If not provided, current credentials will be used. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObjects $Credential = Get-Credential Get-CAHostObject -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -Credential $Credential This example retrieves the CA host object(s) associated with every CA in the target forest using the provided credentials. .INPUTS System.Array .OUTPUTS System.Object #> [CmdletBinding()] param ( [parameter( Mandatory = $true, ValueFromPipeline = $true)] [array]$ADCSObjects, [System.Management.Automation.PSCredential]$Credential, $ForestGC ) process { if ($Credential) { $ADCSObjects | Where-Object objectClass -Match 'pKIEnrollmentService' | ForEach-Object { Get-ADObject $_.CAHostDistinguishedName -Properties * -Server $ForestGC -Credential $Credential } } else { $ADCSObjects | Where-Object objectClass -Match 'pKIEnrollmentService' | ForEach-Object { Get-ADObject $_.CAHostDistinguishedName -Properties * -Server $ForestGC } } } } function Get-RestrictedAdminModeSetting { <# .SYNOPSIS Retrieves the current configuration of the Restricted Admin Mode setting. .DESCRIPTION This script retrieves the current configuration of the Restricted Admin Mode setting from the registry. It checks if the DisableRestrictedAdmin value is set to '0' and the DisableRestrictedAdminOutboundCreds value is set to '1'. If both conditions are met, it returns $true; otherwise, it returns $false. .PARAMETER None .EXAMPLE Get-RestrictedAdminModeSetting True #> $Path = 'HKLM:SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa' try { $RAM = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $Path).DisableRestrictedAdmin $Creds = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $Path).DisableRestrictedAdminOutboundCreds if ($RAM -eq '0' -and $Creds -eq '1') { return $true } else { return $false } } catch { return $false } } function Get-Target { <# .SYNOPSIS Retrieves the target forest(s) based on a provided forest name, input file, or current Active Directory forest. .DESCRIPTION This script retrieves the target forest(s) based on the provided forest name, input file, or current Active Directory forest. If the $Forest parameter is specified, the script sets the target to the provided forest. If the $InputPath parameter is specified, the script reads the target forest(s) from the file specified by the input path. If neither $Forest nor $InputPath is specified, the script retrieves objects from the current Active Directory forest. If the $Credential parameter is specified, the script retrieves the target(s) using the provided credentials. .PARAMETER Forest Specifies a single forest to retrieve objects from. .PARAMETER InputPath Specifies the path to the file containing the target forest(s). .PARAMETER Credential Specifies the credentials to use for retrieving the target(s) from the Active Directory forest. .EXAMPLE Get-Target -Forest "example.com" Sets the target forest to "example.com". .EXAMPLE Get-Target -InputPath "C:\targets.txt" Retrieves the target forest(s) from the file located at "C:\targets.txt". .EXAMPLE Get-Target -Credential $cred Sets the target forest to the current Active Directory forest using the provided credentials. .OUTPUTS System.String The target(s) retrieved based on the specified parameters. #> param ( [string]$Forest, [string]$InputPath, [System.Management.Automation.PSCredential]$Credential ) if ($Forest) { $Targets = $Forest } elseif ($InputPath) { $Targets = Get-Content $InputPath } else { if ($Credential) { $Targets = (Get-ADForest -Credential $Credential).Name } else { $Targets = (Get-ADForest).Name } } return $Targets } function Install-RSATADPowerShell { <# .SYNOPSIS Installs the RSAT AD PowerShell module. .DESCRIPTION This function checks if the current process is elevated and if it is it will prompt to install the RSAT AD PowerShell module. .EXAMPLE Install-RSATADPowerShell #> if (Test-IsElevated) { $OS = (Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem).ProductType # 1 - workstation, 2 - domain controller, 3 - non-dc server if ($OS -gt 1) { Write-Warning "The Active Directory PowerShell module is not installed." Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to install the Active Directory PowerShell module for you.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "`nCOMMAND: Install-WindowsFeature -Name RSAT-AD-PowerShell`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Write-Host "Beginning the ActiveDirectory PowerShell module installation, please wait.." # Attempt to install ActiveDirectory PowerShell module for Windows Server OSes, works with Windows Server 2012 R2 through Windows Server 2022 Install-WindowsFeature -Name RSAT-AD-PowerShell } catch { Write-Error 'Could not install ActiveDirectory PowerShell module. This module needs to be installed to run Locksmith successfully.' } } else { Write-Host "ActiveDirectory PowerShell module NOT installed. Please install to run Locksmith successfully.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow break; } } else { Write-Warning "The Active Directory PowerShell module is not installed." Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to install the Active Directory PowerShell module for you.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "`nCOMMAND: Add-WindowsCapability -Name Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0 -Online`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Write-Host "Beginning the ActiveDirectory PowerShell module installation, please wait.." # Attempt to install ActiveDirectory PowerShell module for Windows Desktop OSes Add-WindowsCapability -Name Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0 -Online } catch { Write-Error 'Could not install ActiveDirectory PowerShell module. This module needs to be installed to run Locksmith successfully.' } } else { Write-Host "ActiveDirectory PowerShell module NOT installed. Please install to run Locksmith successfully.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow break; } } } else { Write-Warning -Message "The ActiveDirectory PowerShell module is required for Locksmith, but is not installed. Please launch an elevated PowerShell session to have this module installed for you automatically." # The goal here is to exit the script without closing the PowerShell window. Need to test. Return } } function Invoke-Remediation { <# .SYNOPSIS Runs any remediation scripts available. .DESCRIPTION This function offers to run any remediation code associated with identified issues. .PARAMETER AuditingIssues A PS Object containing all necessary information about auditing issues. .PARAMETER ESC1 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC1 issues. .PARAMETER ESC2 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC2 issues. .PARAMETER ESC3 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC3 issues. .PARAMETER ESC4 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC4 issues. .PARAMETER ESC5 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC5 issues. .PARAMETER ESC6 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC6 issues. .PARAMETER ESC11 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC11 issues. .PARAMETER ESC13 A PS Object containing all necessary information about ESC13 issues. .INPUTS PS Objects .OUTPUTS Console output #> [CmdletBinding()] param ( $AuditingIssues, $ESC1, $ESC2, $ESC3, $ESC4, $ESC5, $ESC6, $ESC11, $ESC13 ) Write-Host "`nExecuting Mode 4 - Attempting to fix identified issues!`n" -ForegroundColor Green Write-Host 'Creating a script (' -NoNewline Write-Host 'Invoke-RevertLocksmith.ps1' -ForegroundColor White -NoNewline Write-Host ") which can be used to revert all changes made by Locksmith...`n" try { $params = @{ AuditingIssues = $AuditingIssues ESC1 = $ESC1 ESC2 = $ESC2 ESC3 = $ESC3 ESC4 = $ESC4 ESC5 = $ESC5 ESC6 = $ESC6 ESC11 = $ESC11 ESC13 = $ESC13 } Export-RevertScript @params } catch { Write-Warning 'Creation of Invoke-RevertLocksmith.ps1 failed.' Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { # Continue } else { break } } if ($AuditingIssues) { $AuditingIssues | ForEach-Object { $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to fully enable auditing on Certification Authority `"$($_.Name)`".`n" Write-Host 'COMMAND(S) TO BE RUN:' Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "This change should have little to no impact on the AD CS environment.`n" -ForegroundColor Green Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not modify AD CS auditing. Are you a local admin on the CA host?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } if ($ESC1) { $ESC1 | ForEach-Object { $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to enable Manager Approval on the `"$($_.Name)`" template.`n" Write-Host 'CCOMMAND(S) TO BE RUN:' Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "WARNING: This change could cause some services to stop working until certificates are approved.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not enable Manager Approval. Are you an Active Directory or AD CS admin?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } if ($ESC2) { $ESC2 | ForEach-Object { $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to enable Manager Approval on the `"$($_.Name)`" template.`n" Write-Host 'COMMAND(S) TO BE RUN:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "WARNING: This change could cause some services to stop working until certificates are approved.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not enable Manager Approval. Are you an Active Directory or AD CS admin?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } if ($ESC4) { $ESC4 | Where-Object Issue -Like "* Owner rights *" | ForEach-Object { # This selector sucks - Jake $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to set the owner of `"$($_.Name)`" template to Enterprise Admins.`n" Write-Host 'COMMAND(S) TO BE RUN:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "This change should have little to no impact on the AD CS environment.`n" -ForegroundColor Green Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not change Owner. Are you an Active Directory admin?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } if ($ESC5) { $ESC5 | Where-Object Issue -Like "* Owner rights *" | ForEach-Object { # TODO This selector sucks - Jake $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to set the owner of `"$($_.Name)`" object to Enterprise Admins.`n" Write-Host 'COMMAND(S) TO BE RUN:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "This change should have little to no impact on the AD CS environment.`n" -ForegroundColor Green Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not change Owner. Are you an Active Directory admin?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } if ($ESC6) { $ESC6 | ForEach-Object { $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to disable the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag on Certifiction Authority `"$($_.Name)`".`n" Write-Host 'COMMAND(S) TO BE RUN' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan $WarningError = 'n' Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "WARNING: This change could cause some services to stop working.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not disable the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag. Are you an Active Directory or AD CS admin?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } if ($ESC11) { $ESC11 | ForEach-Object { $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to enable the IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST flag on Certifiction Authority `"$($_.Name)`".`n" Write-Host 'COMMAND(S) TO BE RUN' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan $WarningError = 'n' Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "WARNING: This change could cause some services to stop working.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not enable the IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST flag. Are you an Active Directory or AD CS admin?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } if ($ESC13) { $ESC13 | ForEach-Object { $FixBlock = [scriptblock]::Create($_.Fix) Write-Host 'ISSUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Issue)`n" Write-Host 'TECHNIQUE:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "$($_.Technique)`n" Write-Host 'ACTION TO BE PERFORMED:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "Locksmith will attempt to enable Manager Approval on the `"$($_.Name)`" template.`n" Write-Host 'CCOMMAND(S) TO BE RUN:' Write-Host 'PS> ' -NoNewline Write-Host "$($_.Fix)`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host 'OPERATIONAL IMPACT:' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "WARNING: This change could cause some services to stop working until certificates are approved.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "If you continue, Locksmith will attempt to fix this issue.`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "Continue with this operation? [Y] Yes " -NoNewline Write-Host "[N] " -ForegroundColor Yellow -NoNewline Write-Host "No: " -NoNewline $WarningError = '' $WarningError = Read-Host if ($WarningError -like 'y') { try { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $FixBlock } catch { Write-Error 'Could not enable Manager Approval. Are you an Active Directory or AD CS admin?' } } else { Write-Host "SKIPPED!`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow } } } Write-Host "Mode 4 Complete! There are no more issues that Locksmith can automatically resolve.`n" -ForegroundColor Green Write-Host 'If you experience any operational impact from using Locksmith Mode 4, use ' -NoNewline Write-Host 'Invoke-RevertLocksmith.ps1 ' -ForegroundColor White Write-Host "to revert all changes made by Locksmith. It can be found in the current working directory.`n" Write-Host @" REMINDER: Locksmith cannot automatically resolve all AD CS issues at this time. There may be more AD CS issues remaining in your environment. Use Locksmith in Modes 0-3 to further investigate your environment or reach out to the Locksmith team for assistance. We'd love to help!`n "@ -ForegroundColor Yellow } function Invoke-Scans { <# .SYNOPSIS Invoke-Scans.ps1 is a script that performs various scans on ADCS (Active Directory Certificate Services) objects. .PARAMETER Scans Specifies the type of scans to perform. Multiple scan options can be provided as an array. The default value is 'All'. The available scan options are: 'Auditing', 'ESC1', 'ESC2', 'ESC3', 'ESC4', 'ESC5', 'ESC6', 'ESC8', 'ESC11', 'ESC13', 'All', 'PromptMe'. .NOTES - The script requires the following functions to be defined: Find-AuditingIssue, Find-ESC1, Find-ESC2, Find-ESC3Condition1, Find-ESC3Condition2, Find-ESC4, Find-ESC5, Find-ESC6, Find-ESC8, Find-ESC11, Find-ESC13 - The script uses Out-GridView or Out-ConsoleGridView for interactive selection when the 'PromptMe' scan option is chosen. - The script returns a hash table containing the results of the scans. .EXAMPLE Invoke-Scans # Perform all scans .EXAMPLE Invoke-Scans -Scans 'Auditing', 'ESC1' # Perform only the 'Auditing' and 'ESC1' scans .EXAMPLE Invoke-Scans -Scans 'PromptMe' # Prompt the user to select the scans to perform #> [CmdletBinding()] [OutputType([hashtable])] [System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessageAttribute('PSUseSingularNouns', 'Invoke-Scans', Justification = 'Performing multiple scans.')] param ( # Could split Scans and PromptMe into separate parameter sets. [Parameter()] $ClientAuthEkus, $DangerousRights, $EnrollmentAgentEKU, [int]$Mode, $SafeObjectTypes, $SafeOwners, [ValidateSet('Auditing', 'ESC1', 'ESC2', 'ESC3', 'ESC4', 'ESC5', 'ESC6', 'ESC8', 'ESC11', 'ESC13', 'All', 'PromptMe')] [array]$Scans = 'All', $UnsafeOwners, $UnsafeUsers, $PreferredOwner ) # Is this needed? if ($Scans -eq $IsNullOrEmpty) { $Scans = 'All' } if ( $Scans -eq 'PromptMe' ) { $GridViewTitle = 'Select the tests to run and press Enter or click OK to continue...' # Check for Out-GridView or Out-ConsoleGridView if ((Get-Command Out-ConsoleGridView -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) -and ($PSVersionTable.PSVersion.Major -ge 7)) { [array]$Scans = ($Dictionary | Select-Object Name, Category, Subcategory | Out-ConsoleGridView -OutputMode Multiple -Title $GridViewTitle).Name | Sort-Object -Property Name } elseif (Get-Command -Name Out-GridView -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) { [array]$Scans = ($Dictionary | Select-Object Name, Category, Subcategory | Out-GridView -PassThru -Title $GridViewTitle).Name | Sort-Object -Property Name } else { # To Do: Check for admin and prompt to install features/modules or revert to 'All'. Write-Information "Out-GridView and Out-ConsoleGridView were not found on your system. Defaulting to `'All`'." $Scans = 'All' } } switch ( $Scans ) { Auditing { Write-Host 'Identifying auditing issues...' [array]$AuditingIssues = Find-AuditingIssue -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects } ESC1 { Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC1 configurations...' [array]$ESC1 = Find-ESC1 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -ClientAuthEKUs $ClientAuthEkus } ESC2 { Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC2 configurations...' [array]$ESC2 = Find-ESC2 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers } ESC3 { Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC3 configurations...' [array]$ESC3 = Find-ESC3Condition1 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers [array]$ESC3 += Find-ESC3Condition2 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers } ESC4 { Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with poor access control (ESC4)...' [array]$ESC4 = Find-ESC4 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -DangerousRights $DangerousRights -SafeOwners $SafeOwners -SafeObjectTypes $SafeObjectTypes } ESC5 { Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS objects with poor access control (ESC5)...' [array]$ESC5 = Find-ESC5 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -DangerousRights $DangerousRights -SafeOwners $SafeOwners -SafeObjectTypes $SafeObjectTypes } ESC6 { Write-Host 'Identifying Issuing CAs with EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 enabled (ESC6)...' [array]$ESC6 = Find-ESC6 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects } ESC8 { Write-Host 'Identifying HTTP-based certificate enrollment interfaces (ESC8)...' [array]$ESC8 = Find-ESC8 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects } ESC11 { Write-Host 'Identifying Issuing CAs with IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST disabled (ESC11)...' [array]$ESC11 = Find-ESC11 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects } ESC13 { Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC13 configurations...' [array]$ESC11 = Find-ESC13 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -ClientAuthEKUs $ClientAuthEKUs } All { Write-Host 'Identifying auditing issues...' [array]$AuditingIssues = Find-AuditingIssue -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC1 configurations...' [array]$ESC1 = Find-ESC1 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -ClientAuthEKUs $ClientAuthEkus Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC2 configurations...' [array]$ESC2 = Find-ESC2 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC3 configurations...' [array]$ESC3 = Find-ESC3Condition1 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers [array]$ESC3 += Find-ESC3Condition2 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with poor access control (ESC4)...' [array]$ESC4 = Find-ESC4 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -DangerousRights $DangerousRights -SafeOwners $SafeOwners -SafeObjectTypes $SafeObjectTypes -Mode $Mode Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS objects with poor access control (ESC5)...' [array]$ESC5 = Find-ESC5 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -DangerousRights $DangerousRights -SafeOwners $SafeOwners -SafeObjectTypes $SafeObjectTypes Write-Host 'Identifying Certificate Authorities with EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 enabled v (ESC6)...' [array]$ESC6 = Find-ESC6 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects Write-Host 'Identifying HTTP-based certificate enrollment interfaces (ESC8)...' [array]$ESC8 = Find-ESC8 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects Write-Host 'Identifying Certificate Authorities with IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST disabled (ESC11)...' [array]$ESC11 = Find-ESC11 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects Write-Host 'Identifying AD CS templates with dangerous ESC13 configurations...' [array]$ESC13 = Find-ESC13 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -ClientAuthEKUs $ClientAuthEkus Write-Host } } [array]$AllIssues = $AuditingIssues + $ESC1 + $ESC2 + $ESC3 + $ESC4 + $ESC5 + $ESC6 + $ESC8 + $ESC11 + $ESC13 # If these are all empty = no issues found, exit if ((!$AuditingIssues) -and (!$ESC1) -and (!$ESC2) -and (!$ESC3) -and (!$ESC4) -and (!$ESC5) -and (!$ESC6) -and (!$ESC8) -and (!$ESC11) -and (!$ESC13) ) { Write-Host "`n$(Get-Date) : No ADCS issues were found." -ForegroundColor Green break } # Return a hash table of array names (keys) and arrays (values) so they can be directly referenced with other functions Return @{ AllIssues = $AllIssues AuditingIssues = $AuditingIssues ESC1 = $ESC1 ESC2 = $ESC2 ESC3 = $ESC3 ESC4 = $ESC4 ESC5 = $ESC5 ESC6 = $ESC6 ESC8 = $ESC8 ESC11 = $ESC11 ESC13 = $ESC13 } } <# .SYNOPSIS Create a dictionary of the escalation paths and insecure configurations that Locksmith scans for. .DESCRIPTION The New-Dictionary function is used to instantiate an array of objects that contain the names, definitions, descriptions, code used to find, code used to fix, and reference URLs. This is invoked by the module's main function. .NOTES VulnerableConfigurationItem Class Definition: Version Update each time the class definition or the dictionary below is changed. Name The short name of the vulnerable configuration item (VCI). Category The high level category of VCI types, including escalation path, server configuration, GPO setting, etc. Subcategory The subcategory of vulnerable configuration item types. Summary A summary of the vulnerability and how it can be abused. FindIt The name of the function that is used to look for the VCI, stored as an invokable scriptblock. FixIt The name of the function that is used to fix the VCI, stored as an invokable scriptblock. ReferenceUrls An array of URLs that are used as references to learn more about the VCI. #> function New-Dictionary { class VulnerableConfigurationItem { static [string] $Version = '2024.11.03.000' [string]$Name [ValidateSet('Escalation Path', 'Server Configuration', 'GPO Setting')][string]$Category [string]$Subcategory [string]$Summary [scriptblock]$FindIt [scriptblock]$FixIt [uri[]]$ReferenceUrls } [VulnerableConfigurationItem[]]$Dictionary = @( [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC1' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'Vulnerable Client Authentication Templates' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC1 } FixIt = { Write-Output "Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration." } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=Misconfigured%20Certificate%20Templates%20%E2%80%94%20ESC1' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC2' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'Vulnerable SubCA/Any Purpose Templates' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC2 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=Misconfigured%20Certificate%20Templates%20%E2%80%94%20ESC2' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC3' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'Vulnerable Enrollment Agent Templates' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC3Condition1 Find-ESC3Condition2 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=Enrollment%20Agent%20Templates%20%E2%80%94%20ESC3' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC4'; Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'Certificate Templates with Vulnerable Access Controls' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC4 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=Vulnerable%20Certificate%20Template%20Access%20Control%20%E2%80%94%20ESC4' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC5'; Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'PKI Objects with Vulnerable Access Control' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC5 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=Vulnerable%20PKI%20Object%20Access%20Control%20%E2%80%94%20ESC5' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC6' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC6 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2%20%E2%80%94%20ESC6' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC7' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control' Summary = '' FindIt = { Write-Output 'We have not created Find-ESC7 yet.' } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=Vulnerable%20Certificate%20Authority%20Access%20Control%20%E2%80%94%20ESC7' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC8' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'AD CS HTTP Endpoints Vulnerable to NTLM Relay' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC8 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2#:~:text=NTLM%20Relay%20to%20AD%20CS%20HTTP%20Endpoints' }, # [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ # Name = 'ESC9' # Category = 'Escalation Path' # Subcategory = '' # Summary = '' # FindIt = {Find-ESC9} # FixIt = {Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.'} # ReferenceUrls = '' # }, # [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ # Name = 'ESC10' # Category = 'Escalation Path' # Subcategory = '' # Summary = '' # FindIt = {Find-ESC10} # FixIt = {Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.'} # ReferenceUrls = '' # }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC11' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC11 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://blog.compass-security.com/2022/11/relaying-to-ad-certificate-services-over-rpc/' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'ESC13' Category = 'Escalation Path' Subcategory = 'Certificate Template linked to Group' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-ESC13 } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = 'https://posts.specterops.io/adcs-esc13-abuse-technique-fda4272fbd53' }, [VulnerableConfigurationItem]@{ Name = 'Auditing' Category = 'Server Configuration' Subcategory = 'Gaps in auditing on certificate authorities and AD CS objects.' Summary = '' FindIt = { Find-AuditingIssue } FixIt = { Write-Output 'Add code to fix the vulnerable configuration.' } ReferenceUrls = @('https://github.com/TrimarcJake/Locksmith', 'https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/ask-the-directory-services-team/designing-and-implementing-a-pki-part-i-design-and-planning/ba-p/396953') } ) Return $Dictionary } function New-OutputPath { <# .SYNOPSIS Creates output directories for each forest. .DESCRIPTION This script creates one output directory per forest specified in the $Targets variable. The output directories are created under the $OutputPath directory. .PARAMETER Targets Specifies the forests for which output directories need to be created. .PARAMETER OutputPath Specifies the base path where the output directories will be created. .EXAMPLE New-OutputPath -Targets "Forest1", "Forest2" -OutputPath "C:\Output" This example creates two output directories named "Forest1" and "Forest2" under the "C:\Output" directory. #> [CmdletBinding(SupportsShouldProcess)] param () # Create one output directory per forest foreach ( $forest in $Targets ) { $ForestPath = $OutputPath + "`\" + $forest New-Item -Path $ForestPath -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null } } function Set-AdditionalCAProperty { <# .SYNOPSIS Sets additional properties for a Certificate Authority (CA) object. .DESCRIPTION This script sets additional properties for a Certificate Authority (CA) object. It takes an array of AD CS Objects as input, which represent the CA objects to be processed. The script filters the AD CS Objects based on the objectClass property and performs the necessary operations to set the additional properties. .PARAMETER ADCSObjects Specifies the array of AD CS Objects to be processed. This parameter is mandatory and supports pipeline input. .PARAMETER Credential Specifies the PSCredential object to be used for authentication when accessing the CA objects. If not provided, the script will use the current user's credentials. .EXAMPLE $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObject -Filter Set-AdditionalCAProperty -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -ForestGC 'dc1.ad.dotdot.horse:3268' .NOTES Author: Jake Hildreth Date: July 15, 2022 #> [CmdletBinding(SupportsShouldProcess)] param ( [parameter( Mandatory = $true, ValueFromPipeline = $true)] [array]$ADCSObjects, [PSCredential]$Credential, $ForestGC ) begin { $CAEnrollmentEndpoint = @() if (-not ([System.Management.Automation.PSTypeName]'TrustAllCertsPolicy') ) { if ($PSVersionTable.PSEdition -eq 'Desktop') { $code = @" using System.Net; using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates; public class TrustAllCertsPolicy : ICertificatePolicy { public bool CheckValidationResult(ServicePoint srvPoint, X509Certificate certificate, WebRequest request, int certificateProblem) { return true; } } "@ Add-Type -TypeDefinition $code -Language CSharp [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::CertificatePolicy = New-Object TrustAllCertsPolicy } else { Add-Type @" using System.Net; using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates; using System.Net.Security; public class TrustAllCertsPolicy { public static bool TrustAllCerts(object sender, X509Certificate certificate, X509Chain chain, SslPolicyErrors sslPolicyErrors) { return true; } } "@ # Set the ServerCertificateValidationCallback [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = [TrustAllCertsPolicy]::TrustAllCerts } } } process { $ADCSObjects | Where-Object objectClass -Match 'pKIEnrollmentService' | ForEach-Object { #[array]$CAEnrollmentEndpoint = $_.'msPKI-Enrollment-Servers' | Select-String 'http.*' | ForEach-Object { $_.Matches[0].Value } foreach ($directory in @("certsrv/", "$($_.Name)_CES_Kerberos/service.svc", "$($_.Name)_CES_Kerberos/service.svc/CES", "ADPolicyProvider_CEP_Kerberos/service.svc", "certsrv/mscep/")) { $URL = "://$($_.dNSHostName)/$directory" try { $Auth = 'NTLM' $FullURL = "http$URL" $Request = [System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($FullURL) $Cache = [System.Net.CredentialCache]::New() $Cache.Add([System.Uri]::new($FullURL), $Auth, [System.Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials) $Request.Credentials = $Cache $Request.Timeout = 3000 $Request.GetResponse() | Out-Null $CAEnrollmentEndpoint += @{ 'URL' = $FullURL 'Auth' = $Auth } } catch { try { $FullURL = "https$URL" $Request = [System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($FullURL) $Request.GetResponse() | Out-Null $CAEnrollmentEndpoint += @{ 'URL' = $FullURL 'Auth' = $Auth } } catch { try { $Auth = 'Negotiate' $FullURL = "https$URL" $Request = [System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($FullURL) $Cache = [System.Net.CredentialCache]::New() $Cache.Add([System.Uri]::new($FullURL), 'Negotiate', [System.Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials) $Request.Credentials = $Cache $Request.GetResponse() | Out-Null $CAEnrollmentEndpoint += @{ 'URL' = $FullURL 'Auth' = $Auth } } catch { } } } } [string]$CAFullName = "$($_.dNSHostName)\$($_.Name)" $CAHostname = $_.dNSHostName.split('.')[0] if ($Credential) { $CAHostDistinguishedName = (Get-ADObject -Filter { (Name -eq $CAHostName) -and (objectclass -eq 'computer') } -Server $ForestGC -Credential $Credential).DistinguishedName $CAHostFQDN = (Get-ADObject -Filter { (Name -eq $CAHostName) -and (objectclass -eq 'computer') } -Properties DnsHostname -Server $ForestGC -Credential $Credential).DnsHostname } else { $CAHostDistinguishedName = (Get-ADObject -Filter { (Name -eq $CAHostName) -and (objectclass -eq 'computer') } -Server $ForestGC ).DistinguishedName $CAHostFQDN = (Get-ADObject -Filter { (Name -eq $CAHostName) -and (objectclass -eq 'computer') } -Properties DnsHostname -Server $ForestGC).DnsHostname } $ping = Test-Connection -ComputerName $CAHostFQDN -Quiet -Count 1 if ($ping) { try { if ($Credential) { $CertutilAudit = Invoke-Command -ComputerName $CAHostname -Credential $Credential -ScriptBlock { param($CAFullName); certutil -config $CAFullName -getreg CA\AuditFilter } -ArgumentList $CAFullName } else { $CertutilAudit = certutil -config $CAFullName -getreg CA\AuditFilter } } catch { $AuditFilter = 'Failure' } try { if ($Credential) { $CertutilFlag = Invoke-Command -ComputerName $CAHostname -Credential $Credential -ScriptBlock { param($CAFullName); certutil -config $CAFullName -getreg policy\EditFlags } -ArgumentList $CAFullName } else { $CertutilFlag = certutil -config $CAFullName -getreg policy\EditFlags } } catch { $SANFlag = 'Failure' } try { if ($Credential) { $CertutilInterfaceFlag = Invoke-Command -ComputerName $CAHostname -Credential $Credential -ScriptBlock { param($CAFullName); certutil -config $CAFullName -getreg policy\EditFlags } -ArgumentList $CAFullName } else { $CertutilInterfaceFlag = certutil -config $CAFullName -getreg CA\InterfaceFlags } } catch { $InterfaceFlag = 'Failure' } } else { $AuditFilter = 'CA Unavailable' $SANFlag = 'CA Unavailable' $InterfaceFlag = 'CA Unavailable' } if ($CertutilAudit) { try { [string]$AuditFilter = $CertutilAudit | Select-String 'AuditFilter REG_DWORD = ' | Select-String '\(' $AuditFilter = $AuditFilter.split('(')[1].split(')')[0] } catch { try { [string]$AuditFilter = $CertutilAudit | Select-String 'AuditFilter REG_DWORD = ' $AuditFilter = $AuditFilter.split('=')[1].trim() } catch { $AuditFilter = 'Never Configured' } } } if ($CertutilFlag) { [string]$SANFlag = $CertutilFlag | Select-String ' EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 -- 40000 \(' if ($SANFlag) { $SANFlag = 'Yes' } else { $SANFlag = 'No' } } if ($CertutilInterfaceFlag) { [string]$InterfaceFlag = $CertutilInterfaceFlag | Select-String ' IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST -- 200 \(' if ($InterfaceFlag) { $InterfaceFlag = 'Yes' } else { $InterfaceFlag = 'No' } } Add-Member -InputObject $_ -MemberType NoteProperty -Name AuditFilter -Value $AuditFilter -Force Add-Member -InputObject $_ -MemberType NoteProperty -Name CAEnrollmentEndpoint -Value $CAEnrollmentEndpoint -Force Add-Member -InputObject $_ -MemberType NoteProperty -Name CAFullName -Value $CAFullName -Force Add-Member -InputObject $_ -MemberType NoteProperty -Name CAHostname -Value $CAHostname -Force Add-Member -InputObject $_ -MemberType NoteProperty -Name CAHostDistinguishedName -Value $CAHostDistinguishedName -Force Add-Member -InputObject $_ -MemberType NoteProperty -Name SANFlag -Value $SANFlag -Force Add-Member -InputObject $_ -MemberType NoteProperty -Name InterfaceFlag -Value $InterfaceFlag -Force } } } function Set-Severity { [OutputType([string])] [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [array]$Issue ) foreach ($Finding in $Issue) { try { # Auditing if ($Finding.Technique -eq 'DETECT') { return 'Medium' } # ESC6 if ($Finding.Technique -eq 'ESC6') { return 'High' } # ESC8 if ($Finding.Technique -eq 'ESC8') { return 'High' } # ESC1, ESC2, ESC4, ESC5 $SID = ConvertFrom-IdentityReference -Object $Finding.IdentityReference if ($SID -match $SafeUsers -or $SID -match $SafeOwners) { return 'Medium' } if (($SID -notmatch $SafeUsers -and $SID -notmatch $SafeOwners) -and ($Finding.ActiveDirectoryRights -match $DangerousRights)) { return 'Critical' } } catch { Write-Error "Could not determine issue severity for issue: $($Issue.Issue)" return 'Unknown Failure' } } } function Show-LocksmithLogo { Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#+==============#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#=====================#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%%%%#=========================#%%%%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%%%=============================%%%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%#==============+++==============#%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%#===========#%%%%%%%%%#===========#%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%==========%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%==========%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%*=========%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%=========*%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%+========*%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#=========%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%+========#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#=========%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%+========#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#=========%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%+========#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#=========%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%+========#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#=========%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%+========#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%#=========%%%%%%%' Write-Host '%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%' Write-Host '#=================================================#' Write-Host '#=================================================#' Write-Host '#=================+%%%============================#' Write-Host '#==================%%%%*==========================#' Write-Host '#===================*%%%%+========================#' Write-Host '#=====================#%%%%=======================#' Write-Host '#======================+%%%%#=====================#' Write-Host '#========================*%%%%*===================#' Write-Host '#========================+%%%%%===================#' Write-Host '#======================#%%%%%+====================#' Write-Host '#===================+%%%%%%=======================#' Write-Host '#=================#%%%%%+=========================#' Write-Host '#==============+%%%%%#============================#' Write-Host '#============*%%%%%+====+%%%%%%%%%%===============#' Write-Host '#=============%%*========+********+===============#' Write-Host '#=================================================#' Write-Host '#=================================================#' Write-Host '#=================================================#' } function Test-IsADAdmin { <# .SYNOPSIS Tests if the current user has administrative rights in Active Directory. .DESCRIPTION This function returns True if the current user is a Domain Admin (or equivalent) or False if not. .EXAMPLE Test-IsADAdmin .EXAMPLE if (!(Test-IsADAdmin)) { Write-Host "You are not running with Domain Admin rights and will not be able to make certain changes." -ForeGroundColor Yellow } #> if ( # Need to test to make sure this checks domain groups and not local groups, particularly for 'Administrators' (reference SID instead of name?). ([Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal][Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()).IsInRole("Domain Admins") -or ([Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal][Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()).IsInRole("Administrators") -or ([Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal][Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()).IsInRole("Enterprise Admins") ) { Return $true } else { Return $false } } function Test-IsElevated { <# .SYNOPSIS Tests if PowerShell is running with elevated privileges (run as Administrator). .DESCRIPTION This function returns True if the script is being run as an administrator or False if not. .EXAMPLE Test-IsElevated .EXAMPLE if (!(Test-IsElevated)) { Write-Host "You are not running with elevated privileges and will not be able to make any changes." -ForeGroundColor Yellow } .EXAMPLE # Prompt to launch elevated if not already running as administrator: if (!(Test-IsElevated)) { $arguments = "& '" + $myinvocation.mycommand.definition + "'" Start-Process powershell -Verb runAs -ArgumentList $arguments Break } #> $identity = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() $principal = New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal $identity $principal.IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltinRole]::Administrator) } function Test-IsLocalAccountSession { <# .SYNOPSIS Tests if the current session is running under a local user account or a domain account. .DESCRIPTION This function returns True if the current session is a local user or False if it is a domain user. .EXAMPLE Test-IsLocalAccountSession .EXAMPLE if ( (Test-IsLocalAccountSession) ) { Write-Host "You are running this script under a local account." -ForeGroundColor Yellow } #> [CmdletBinding()] $CurrentSID = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value $LocalSIDs = (Get-LocalUser).SID.Value if ($CurrentSID -in $LocalSIDs) { Return $true } } function Test-IsMemberOfProtectedUsers { <# .SYNOPSIS Check to see if a user is a member of the Protected Users group. .DESCRIPTION This function checks to see if a specified user or the current user is a member of the Protected Users group in AD. It also checked the user's primary group ID in case that is set to 525 (Protected Users). .PARAMETER User The user that will be checked for membership in the Protected Users group. This parameter accepts input from the pipeline. .EXAMPLE This example will check if JaneDoe is a member of the Protected Users group. Test-IsMemberOfProtectedUsers -User JaneDoe .EXAMPLE This example will check if the current user is a member of the Protected Users group. Test-IsMemberOfProtectedUsers .INPUTS Active Directory user object, user SID, SamAccountName, etc .OUTPUTS Boolean #> [System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessageAttribute('PSUseSingularNouns', 'Test-IsMemberOfProtectedUsers', Justification = 'The name of the group we are checking is plural.')] [OutputType([Boolean])] [CmdletBinding()] param ( # User parameter accepts any input that is valid for Get-ADUser [Parameter( ValueFromPipeline = $true )] $User ) Import-Module ActiveDirectory # Use the currently logged in user if none is specified # Get the user from Active Directory if (-not($User)) { # These two are different types. Fixed by referencing $CheckUser.SID later, but should fix here by using one type. $CurrentUser = ([System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().Name).Split('\')[-1] $CheckUser = Get-ADUser $CurrentUser -Properties primaryGroupID } else { $CheckUser = Get-ADUser $User -Properties primaryGroupID } # Get the Protected Users group by SID instead of by its name to ensure compatibility with any locale or language. $DomainSID = (Get-ADDomain).DomainSID.Value $ProtectedUsersSID = "$DomainSID-525" # Get members of the Protected Users group for the current domain. Recuse in case groups are nested in it. $ProtectedUsers = Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $ProtectedUsersSID -Recursive | Select-Object -Unique # Check if the current user is in the 'Protected Users' group if ($ProtectedUsers.SID.Value -contains $CheckUser.SID) { Write-Verbose "$($CheckUser.Name) ($($CheckUser.DistinguishedName)) is a member of the Protected Users group." $true } else { # Check if the user's PGID (primary group ID) is set to the Protected Users group RID (525). if ( $CheckUser.primaryGroupID -eq '525' ) { $true } else { Write-Verbose "$($CheckUser.Name) ($($CheckUser.DistinguishedName)) is not a member of the Protected Users group." $false } } } function Test-IsRecentVersion { <# .SYNOPSIS Check if the installed version of the Locksmith module is up to date. .DESCRIPTION This script checks the installed version of the Locksmith module against the latest release on GitHub. It determines if the installed version is considered "out of date" based on the number of days specified. If the installed version is out of date, a warning message is displayed along with information about the latest release. .PARAMETER Version Specifies the version number to check from the script. .PARAMETER Days Specifies the number of days past a module release date at which to consider the release "out of date". The default value is 60 days. .OUTPUTS System.Boolean Returns $true if the installed version is up to date, and $false if it is out of date. .EXAMPLE Test-IsRecentVersion -Version "2024.1" -Days 30 True Test-IsRecentVersion -Version "2023.10" -Days 60 WARNING: Your currently installed version of Locksmith (2.5) is more than 60 days old. We recommend that you update to ensure the latest findings are included. Locksmith Module Details: Latest Version: v2024.1 Published at: 01/28/2024 12:47:18 Install Module: Install-Module -Name Locksmith Standalone Script: https://github.com/trimarcjake/locksmith/releases/download/v2.6/Invoke-Locksmith.zip #> [CmdletBinding()] [OutputType([boolean])] param ( # Check a specific version number from the script [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$Version, # Define the number of days past a module release date at which to consider the release "out of date." [Parameter()] [int16]$Days = 60 ) # Strip the 'v' if it was used so the script can work with or without it in the input $Version = $Version.Replace('v', '') try { # Checking the most recent release in GitHub, but we could also use PowerShell Gallery. $Uri = "https://api.github.com/repos/trimarcjake/locksmith/releases" $Releases = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Method Get -DisableKeepAlive -ErrorAction Stop $LatestRelease = $Releases | Sort-Object -Property Published_At -Descending | Select-Object -First 1 # Get the release date of the currently running version via the version parameter [datetime]$InstalledVersionReleaseDate = ($Releases | Where-Object { $_.tag_name -like "?$Version" }).published_at [datetime]$LatestReleaseDate = $LatestRelease.published_at # $ModuleDownloadLink = ( ($LatestRelease.Assets).Where({$_.Name -like "Locksmith-v*.zip"}) ).browser_download_url $ScriptDownloadLink = ( ($LatestRelease.Assets).Where({ $_.Name -eq 'Invoke-Locksmith.zip' }) ).browser_download_url $LatestReleaseInfo = @" Locksmith Module Details: Latest Version:`t`t $($LatestRelease.name) Published at: `t`t $LatestReleaseDate Install Module:`t`t Install-Module -Name Locksmith Standalone Script:`t $ScriptDownloadLink "@ } catch { Write-Warning "Unable to find the latest available version of the Locksmith module on GitHub." -WarningAction Continue # Find the approximate release date of the installed version. Handles version with or without 'v' prefix. $InstalledVersionMonth = [datetime]::Parse(($Version.Replace('v', '')).Replace('.', '-') + "-01") # Release date is typically the first Saturday of the month. Let's guess as close as possible! $InstalledVersionReleaseDate = $InstalledVersionMonth.AddDays( 6 - ($InstallVersionMonth.DayOfWeek) ) } # The date at which to consider this module "out of date" is based on the $Days parameter $OutOfDateDate = (Get-Date).Date.AddDays(-$Days) $OutOfDateMessage = "Your currently installed version of Locksmith ($Version) is more than $Days days old. We recommend that you update to ensure the latest findings are included." # Compare the installed version release date to the latest release date if ( ($LatestReleaseDate) -and ($InstalledVersionReleaseDate -le ($LatestReleaseDate.AddDays(-$Days))) ) { # If we found the latest release date online and the installed version is more than [x] days older than it: Write-Warning -Verbose -Message $OutOfDateMessage -WarningAction Continue Write-Information -MessageData $LatestReleaseInfo -InformationAction Continue $IsRecentVersion = $false } elseif ( $InstalledVersionReleaseDate -le $OutOfDateDate ) { # If we didn't get the latest release date online, use the estimated release date to check age. Write-Warning -Verbose -Message $OutOfDateMessage -WarningAction Continue $IsRecentVersion = $false } else { # The installed version has not been found to be out of date. $IsRecentVersion = $True } # Return true/false $IsRecentVersion } function Test-IsRSATInstalled { <# .SYNOPSIS Tests if the RSAT AD PowerShell module is installed. .DESCRIPTION This function returns True if the RSAT AD PowerShell module is installed or False if not. .EXAMPLE Test-IsElevated #> if (Get-Module -Name 'ActiveDirectory' -ListAvailable) { $true } else { $false } } function Update-ESC4Remediation { <# .SYNOPSIS This function asks the user a set of questions to provide the most appropriate remediation for ESC4 issues. .DESCRIPTION This function takes a single ESC4 issue as input. It then prompts the user if the principal with the ESC4 rights administers the template in question. If the principal is an admin of the template, the Issue attribute to indicate this configuration is expected, and the Fix attribute for the issue is updated to indicate no remediation is needed. If the the principal is not an admin of the template AND the rights assigned is GenericAll, Locksmith will ask if Enroll or AutoEnroll rights are needed. Depending on the answers to the listed questions, the Fix attribute is updated accordingly. .PARAMETER Issue A pscustomobject that includes all pertinent information about the ESC4 issue. .OUTPUTS This function updates ESC4 remediations customized to the user's needs. .EXAMPLE $Target = Get-Target $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObject -Target $Target $DangerousRights = @('GenericAll', 'WriteProperty', 'WriteOwner', 'WriteDacl') $SafeOwners = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$' $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' $SafeObjectTypes = '0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55|a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2' $ESC4Issues = Find-ESC4 -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -DangerousRights $DangerousRights -SafeOwners $SafeOwners -SafeUsers $SafeUsers -SafeObjectTypes $SafeObjectTypes foreach ($issue in $ESCIssues) { Update-ESC4Remediation -Issue $Issue } #> [CmdletBinding()] param( $Issue ) $Header = "`n[!] ESC4 Issue detected in $($Issue.Name)" Write-Host $Header -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host $('-' * $Header.Length) -ForegroundColor Yellow Write-Host "$($Issue.IdentityReference) has $($Issue.ActiveDirectoryRights) rights on this template.`n" Write-Host 'To provide the most appropriate remediation for this issue, Locksmith will now ask you a few questions.' $Admin = '' do { $Admin = Read-Host "`nDoes $($Issue.IdentityReference) administer and/or maintain the $($Issue.Name) template? [y/n]" } while ( ($Admin -ne 'y') -and ($Admin -ne 'n') ) if ($Admin -eq 'y') { $Issue.Issue = "$($Issue.IdentityReference) has $($Issue.ActiveDirectoryRights) rights on this template, but this is expected." $Issue.Fix = "No immediate remediation required." } elseif ($Issue.Issue -match 'GenericAll') { $RightsToRestore = 0 while ($RightsToRestore -notin 1..5) { [string]$Question = @" Does $($Issue.IdentityReference) need to Enroll and/or AutoEnroll in the $($Issue.Name) template? 1. Enroll 2. AutoEnroll 3. Both 4. Neither 5. Unsure Enter your selection [1-5] "@ $RightsToRestore = Read-Host $Question } switch ($RightsToRestore) { 1 { $Issue.Fix = @" `$Path = 'AD:$($Issue.DistinguishedName)' `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `$Path `$IdentityReference = [System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]::New('$($Issue.IdentityReference)') `$EnrollGuid = [System.Guid]::New('0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55') `$ExtendedRight = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryRights]::ExtendedRight `$AccessType = [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow `$InheritanceType = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurityInheritance]::All `$NewRule = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule `$IdentityReference, `$ExtendedRight, `$AccessType, `$EnrollGuid, `$InheritanceType foreach ( `$ace in `$ACL.access ) { if ( (`$ace.IdentityReference.Value -like '$($Issue.IdentityReference)' ) -and ( `$ace.ActiveDirectoryRights -notmatch '^ExtendedRight$') ) { `$ACL.RemoveAccessRule(`$ace) | Out-Null } } `$ACL.AddAccessRule(`$NewRule) Set-Acl -Path `$Path -AclObject `$ACL "@ } 2 { $Issue.Fix = @" `$Path = 'AD:$($Issue.DistinguishedName)' `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `$Path `$IdentityReference = [System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]::New('$($Issue.IdentityReference)') `$AutoEnrollGuid = [System.Guid]::New('a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2') `$ExtendedRight = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryRights]::ExtendedRight `$AccessType = [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow `$InheritanceType = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurityInheritance]::All `$AutoEnrollRule = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule `$IdentityReference, `$ExtendedRight, `$AccessType, `$AutoEnrollGuid, `$InheritanceType foreach ( `$ace in `$ACL.access ) { if ( (`$ace.IdentityReference.Value -like '$($Issue.IdentityReference)' ) -and ( `$ace.ActiveDirectoryRights -notmatch '^ExtendedRight$') ) { `$ACL.RemoveAccessRule(`$ace) | Out-Null } } `$ACL.AddAccessRule(`$AutoEnrollRule) Set-Acl -Path `$Path -AclObject `$ACL "@ } 3 { $Issue.Fix = @" `$Path = 'AD:$($Issue.DistinguishedName)' `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `$Path `$IdentityReference = [System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]::New('$($Issue.IdentityReference)') `$EnrollGuid = [System.Guid]::New('0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55') `$AutoEnrollGuid = [System.Guid]::New('a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2') `$ExtendedRight = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryRights]::ExtendedRight `$AccessType = [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow `$InheritanceType = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurityInheritance]::All `$EnrollRule = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule `$IdentityReference, `$ExtendedRight, `$AccessType, `$EnrollGuid, `$InheritanceType `$AutoEnrollRule = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule `$IdentityReference, `$ExtendedRight, `$AccessType, `$AutoEnrollGuid, `$InheritanceType foreach ( `$ace in `$ACL.access ) { if ( (`$ace.IdentityReference.Value -like '$($Issue.IdentityReference)' ) -and ( `$ace.ActiveDirectoryRights -notmatch '^ExtendedRight$') ) { `$ACL.RemoveAccessRule(`$ace) | Out-Null } } `$ACL.AddAccessRule(`$EnrollRule) `$ACL.AddAccessRule(`$AutoEnrollRule) Set-Acl -Path `$Path -AclObject `$ACL "@ } 4 { break } 5 { $Issue.Fix = @" `$Path = 'AD:$($Issue.DistinguishedName)' `$ACL = Get-Acl -Path `$Path `$IdentityReference = [System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]::New('$($Issue.IdentityReference)') `$EnrollGuid = [System.Guid]::New('0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55') `$AutoEnrollGuid = [System.Guid]::New('a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2') `$ExtendedRight = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryRights]::ExtendedRight `$AccessType = [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow `$InheritanceType = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurityInheritance]::All `$EnrollRule = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule `$IdentityReference, `$ExtendedRight, `$AccessType, `$EnrollGuid, `$InheritanceType `$AutoEnrollRule = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule `$IdentityReference, `$ExtendedRight, `$AccessType, `$AutoEnrollGuid, `$InheritanceType foreach ( `$ace in `$ACL.access ) { if ( (`$ace.IdentityReference.Value -like '$($Issue.IdentityReference)' ) -and ( `$ace.ActiveDirectoryRights -notmatch '^ExtendedRight$') ) { `$ACL.RemoveAccessRule(`$ace) | Out-Null } } `$ACL.AddAccessRule(`$EnrollRule) `$ACL.AddAccessRule(`$AutoEnrollRule) Set-Acl -Path `$Path -AclObject `$ACL "@ } } } } function Invoke-Locksmith { <# .SYNOPSIS Finds the most common malconfigurations of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). .DESCRIPTION Locksmith uses the Active Directory (AD) Powershell (PS) module to identify 10 misconfigurations commonly found in Enterprise mode AD CS installations. .COMPONENT Locksmith requires the AD PS module to be installed in the scope of the Current User. If Locksmith does not identify the AD PS module as installed, it will attempt to install the module. If module installation does not complete successfully, Locksmith will fail. .PARAMETER Mode Specifies sets of common script execution modes. -Mode 0 Finds any malconfigurations and displays them in the console. No attempt is made to fix identified issues. -Mode 1 Finds any malconfigurations and displays them in the console. Displays example Powershell snippet that can be used to resolve the issue. No attempt is made to fix identified issues. -Mode 2 Finds any malconfigurations and writes them to a series of CSV files. No attempt is made to fix identified issues. -Mode 3 Finds any malconfigurations and writes them to a series of CSV files. Creates code snippets to fix each issue and writes them to an environment-specific custom .PS1 file. No attempt is made to fix identified issues. -Mode 4 Finds any malconfigurations and creates code snippets to fix each issue. Attempts to fix all identified issues. This mode may require high-privileged access. .PARAMETER Scans Specify which scans you want to run. Available scans: 'All' or Auditing, ESC1, ESC2, ESC3, ESC4, ESC5, ESC6, ESC8, or 'PromptMe' -Scans All Run all scans (default) -Scans PromptMe Presents a grid view of the available scan types that can be selected and run them after you click OK. .PARAMETER OutputPath Specify the path where you want to save reports and mitigation scripts. .INPUTS None. You cannot pipe objects to Invoke-Locksmith.ps1. .OUTPUTS Output types: 1. Console display of identified issues 2. Console display of identified issues and their fixes 3. CSV containing all identified issues 4. CSV containing all identified issues and their fixes .NOTES Windows PowerShell cmdlet Restart-Service requires RunAsAdministrator #> [CmdletBinding()] param ( #[string]$Forest, # Not used yet #[string]$InputPath, # Not used yet # The mode to run Locksmith in. Defaults to 0. [Parameter()] [ValidateSet(0, 1, 2, 3, 4)] [int]$Mode = 0, # The scans to run. Defaults to 'All'. [Parameter()] [ValidateSet('Auditing', 'ESC1', 'ESC2', 'ESC3', 'ESC4', 'ESC5', 'ESC6', 'ESC8', 'All', 'PromptMe')] [array]$Scans = 'All', # The directory to save the output in (defaults to the current working directory). [Parameter()] [ValidateScript({ Test-Path -Path $_ -PathType Container })] [string]$OutputPath = $PWD, # The credential to use for working with ADCS. [Parameter()] [System.Management.Automation.PSCredential]$Credential ) $Version = '2024.11.11' $LogoPart1 = @" _ _____ _______ _ _ _______ _______ _____ _______ _ _ | | | | |____/ |______ | | | | | |_____| |_____ |_____| |_____ | \_ ______| | | | __|__ | | | "@ $LogoPart2 = @" .--. .--. .--. /.-. '----------. /.-. '----------. /.-. '----------. \'-' .---'-''-'-' \'-' .--'--''-'-' \'-' .--'--'-''-' '--' '--' '--' "@ $VersionBanner = " v$Version" Write-Host $LogoPart1 -ForegroundColor Magenta Write-Host $LogoPart2 -ForegroundColor White Write-Host $VersionBanner -ForegroundColor Red # Check if ActiveDirectory PowerShell module is available, and attempt to install if not found $RSATInstalled = Test-IsRSATInstalled if ($RSATInstalled) { # Continue } else { Install-RSATADPowerShell } # Exit if running in restricted admin mode without explicit credentials if (!$Credential -and (Get-RestrictedAdminModeSetting)) { Write-Warning "Restricted Admin Mode appears to be in place, re-run with the '-Credential domain\user' option" break } ### Initial variables # For output filenames [string]$FilePrefix = "Locksmith $(Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd hh-mm-ss')" # Extended Key Usages for client authentication. A requirement for ESC1, ESC3 Condition 2, and ESC13 $ClientAuthEKUs = '1\.3\.6\.1\.5\.5\.7\.3\.2|1\.3\.6\.1\.5\.2\.3\.4|1\.3\.6\.1\.4\.1\.311\.20\.2\.2|2\.5\.29\.37\.0' # GenericAll, WriteDacl, and WriteOwner all permit full control of an AD object. # WriteProperty may or may not permit full control depending the specific property and AD object type. $DangerousRights = 'GenericAll|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|WriteProperty' # Extended Key Usage for client authentication. A requirement for ESC3. $EnrollmentAgentEKU = '1\.3\.6\.1\.4\.1\.311\.20\.2\.1' # The well-known GUIDs for Enroll and AutoEnroll rights on AD CS templates. $SafeObjectTypes = '0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55|a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2' <# -512$ = Domain Admins group -519$ = Enterprise Admins group -544$ = Administrators group -18$ = SYSTEM -517$ = Cert Publishers -500$ = Built-in Administrator #> $SafeOwners = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$' <# -512$ = Domain Admins group -519$ = Enterprise Admins group -544$ = Administrators group -18$ = SYSTEM -517$ = Cert Publishers -500$ = Built-in Administrator -516$ = Domain Controllers -9$ = Enterprise Domain Controllers -526$ = Key Admins -527$ = Enterprise Key Admins S-1-5-10 = SELF #> $SafeUsers = '-512$|-519$|-544$|-18$|-517$|-500$|-516$|-9$|-526$|-527$|S-1-5-10' <# S-1-1-0 = Everyone -11$ = Authenticated Users -513$ = Domain Users -515$ = Domain Computers #> $UnsafeOwners = 'S-1-1-0|-11$|-513$|-515$' $UnsafeUsers = 'S-1-1-0|-11$|-513$|-515$' ### Generated variables # $Dictionary = New-Dictionary $Forest = Get-ADForest $ForestGC = $(Get-ADDomainController -Discover -Service GlobalCatalog -ForceDiscover | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Hostname) + ":3268" # $DNSRoot = [string]($Forest.RootDomain | Get-ADDomain).DNSRoot $EnterpriseAdminsSID = ([string]($Forest.RootDomain | Get-ADDomain).DomainSID) + '-519' $PreferredOwner = [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]::New($EnterpriseAdminsSID) # $DomainSIDs = $Forest.Domains | ForEach-Object { (Get-ADDomain $_).DomainSID.Value } # Add SIDs of (probably) Safe Users to $SafeUsers Get-ADGroupMember $EnterpriseAdminsSID | ForEach-Object { $SafeUsers += '|' + $_.SID.Value } $Forest.Domains | ForEach-Object { $DomainSID = (Get-ADDomain $_).DomainSID.Value <# -517 = Cert Publishers -512 = Domain Admins group #> $SafeGroupRIDs = @('-517', '-512') # Administrators group $SafeGroupSIDs = @('S-1-5-32-544') foreach ($rid in $SafeGroupRIDs ) { $SafeGroupSIDs += $DomainSID + $rid } foreach ($sid in $SafeGroupSIDs) { $users += (Get-ADGroupMember $sid -Server $_ -Recursive).SID.Value } foreach ($user in $users) { $SafeUsers += '|' + $user } } $SafeUsers = $SafeUsers.Replace('||', '|') if ($Credential) { $Targets = Get-Target -Credential $Credential } else { $Targets = Get-Target } Write-Host "Gathering AD CS Objects from $($Targets)..." if ($Credential) { $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObject -Targets $Targets -Credential $Credential Set-AdditionalCAProperty -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -Credential $Credential -ForestGC $ForestGC $ADCSObjects += Get-CAHostObject -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -Credential $Credential -ForestGC $ForestGC $CAHosts = Get-CAHostObject -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -Credential $Credential -ForestGC $ForestGC } else { $ADCSObjects = Get-ADCSObject -Targets $Targets Set-AdditionalCAProperty -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -ForestGC $ForestGC $ADCSObjects += Get-CAHostObject -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -ForestGC $ForestGC $CAHosts = Get-CAHostObject -ADCSObjects $ADCSObjects -ForestGC $ForestGC } # Add SIDs of CA Hosts to $SafeUsers $CAHosts | ForEach-Object { $SafeUsers += '|' + $_.objectSid } #if ( $Scans ) { # If the Scans parameter was used, Invoke-Scans with the specified checks. $ScansParameters = @{ ClientAuthEkus = $ClientAuthEKUs DangerousRights = $DangerousRights EnrollmentAgentEKU = $EnrollmentAgentEKU Mode = $Mode SafeObjectTypes = $SafeObjectTypes SafeOwners = $SafeOwners Scans = $Scans UnsafeOwners = $UnsafeOwners UnsafeUsers = $UnsafeUsers PreferredOwner = $PreferredOwner } $Results = Invoke-Scans @ScansParameters # Re-hydrate the findings arrays from the Results hash table $AllIssues = $Results['AllIssues'] $AuditingIssues = $Results['AuditingIssues'] $ESC1 = $Results['ESC1'] $ESC2 = $Results['ESC2'] $ESC3 = $Results['ESC3'] $ESC4 = $Results['ESC4'] $ESC5 = $Results['ESC5'] $ESC6 = $Results['ESC6'] $ESC8 = $Results['ESC8'] $ESC11 = $Results['ESC11'] $ESC13 = $Results['ESC13'] # If these are all empty = no issues found, exit if ($null -eq $Results) { Write-Host "`n$(Get-Date) : No ADCS issues were found.`n" -ForegroundColor Green Write-Host 'Thank you for using ' -NoNewline Write-Host "❤ Locksmith ❤ `n" -ForegroundColor Magenta break } switch ($Mode) { 0 { Format-Result $AuditingIssues '0' Format-Result $ESC1 '0' Format-Result $ESC2 '0' Format-Result $ESC3 '0' Format-Result $ESC4 '0' Format-Result $ESC5 '0' Format-Result $ESC6 '0' Format-Result $ESC8 '0' Format-Result $ESC11 '0' Format-Result $ESC13 '0' } 1 { Format-Result $AuditingIssues '1' Format-Result $ESC1 '1' Format-Result $ESC2 '1' Format-Result $ESC3 '1' Format-Result $ESC4 '1' Format-Result $ESC5 '1' Format-Result $ESC6 '1' Format-Result $ESC8 '1' Format-Result $ESC11 '1' Format-Result $ESC13 '1' } 2 { $Output = Join-Path -Path $OutputPath -ChildPath "$FilePrefix ADCSIssues.CSV" Write-Host "Writing AD CS issues to $Output..." try { $AllIssues | Select-Object Forest, Technique, Name, Issue | Export-Csv -NoTypeInformation $Output Write-Host "$Output created successfully!`n" } catch { Write-Host 'Ope! Something broke.' } } 3 { $Output = Join-Path -Path $OutputPath -ChildPath "$FilePrefix ADCSRemediation.CSV" Write-Host "Writing AD CS issues to $Output..." try { $AllIssues | Select-Object Forest, Technique, Name, DistinguishedName, Issue, Fix | Export-Csv -NoTypeInformation $Output Write-Host "$Output created successfully!`n" } catch { Write-Host 'Ope! Something broke.' } } 4 { $params = @{ AuditingIssues = $AuditingIssues ESC1 = $ESC1 ESC2 = $ESC2 ESC3 = $ESC3 ESC4 = $ESC4 ESC5 = $ESC5 ESC6 = $ESC6 ESC11 = $ESC11 ESC13 = $ESC13 } Invoke-Remediation @params } } Write-Host 'Thank you for using ' -NoNewline Write-Host "Locksmith ❤`n" -ForegroundColor Magenta } # Export functions and aliases as required Export-ModuleMember -Function @('Invoke-Locksmith') -Alias @() |